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ABSTRACT
ANALYSIS OF ANDROID RANDOM NUMBER
GENERATOR
Serkan Sarıtas¸
M.S. in Computer Engineering
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. A. Aydın Selc¸uk
May, 2013
Randomness is a crucial resource for cryptography, and random number genera-
tors are critical building blocks of almost all cryptographic systems. Therefore,
random number generation is one of the key parts of secure communication. Ran-
dom number generation does not guarantee security. Problematic random number
generation process may result in breaking the encrypted communication channel,
because encryption keys are obtained by using random numbers. For computers
and smart devices, generation of random numbers is done by operating systems.
Applications which need random numbers for their operation request them from
the operating system they are working on.
Due to the importance of random number generation, this process should be
analyzed deeply and cryptographically for different operating systems. From this
perspective, we studied Android random number generation process by looking at
the source codes and found that security of random number generation done by
Android relies on the security of random number generation of Linux. Then we
analyzed Android random number generator by modifying the kernel source code
and applying some tests on its entropy estimator. Finally, we looked for possible
weaknesses of random number generator during startup of Android devices.
Keywords: SecureRandom, random number generation/generators, Linux RNG,
Android RNG, entropy estimator.
iii
O¨ZET
ANDROID RASSAL SAYI U¨RETECI˙NI˙N ANALI˙ZI˙
Serkan Sarıtas¸
Bilgisayar Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Y. Doc¸. Dr. A. Aydın Selc¸uk
Mayıs, 2013
Rassallık, kriptoloji ic¸in c¸ok o¨nemli bir kavramdır ve rassal sayı u¨retec¸leri, hemen
hemen tu¨m kriptografik sistemlerde kullanılan temel yapı tas¸larındandır. Bu ne-
denle, rassal sayı u¨retimi, gu¨venli iletis¸imin anahtar noktalarındandır. Rassal sayı
u¨retimi gu¨venli iletis¸imin gu¨vencesini vermez. Sorunlu rassal sayı u¨retim is¸lemi,
zayıf s¸ifreleme anahtarları olus¸turacag˘ından gu¨venli iletis¸im hatlarının kırılmasına
sebep olabilir. Bilgisayarlar ve akıllı cihazlarda rassal sayı u¨retimi, is¸letim sistem-
leri tarafından gerc¸ekles¸tirilir. Uygulamalar, c¸alıs¸maları esnasında ihtiyac¸ duy-
dukları rassal sayıları, is¸letim sistemlerinden talep ederler.
Rassal sayı u¨retiminin c¸ok hassas ve o¨nemli bir su¨rec¸ olmasından o¨tu¨ru¨, bu
su¨recin farklı is¸letim sistemleri ic¸in derinlemesine ve kriptografik olarak incelen-
mesi gerekmektedir. Bu noktadan yola c¸ıkarak, Android is¸letim sisteminin kaynak
kodlarına bakarak rassal sayı u¨retim su¨recini inceledik ve Android is¸letim sistem-
inin gu¨venli rassal sayı u¨retiminin Linux is¸letim sisteminin rassal sayı u¨retiminin
gu¨venlig˘ine bag˘lı oldug˘unu tespit ettik. Ardından Android is¸letim sisteminin
c¸ekirdeg˘inin kaynak kodlarını deg˘is¸tirerek rassal sayı u¨retecini test ettik ve en-
tropi tahminleri u¨zerinde farklı testler gerc¸ekles¸tirdik. Son olarak, Android cihaz-
ların ac¸ılıs¸ı esnasında, rassal sayı u¨retimi merkezli ortaya c¸ıkabilecek zayıflıkları
aras¸tırdık.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : SecureRandom, rassal sayı u¨retimi/u¨retec¸leri, Linux Rassal
Sayı U¨reteci, Android Rassal Sayı U¨reteci, entropi tahmini.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
”Everything we do to achieve
privacy and security in the
computer age depends on
random numbers.”
—Simon Cooper
”Random numbers should not
be generated with a method
chosen at random.”
—Donald Knuth
In this research, we investigate the random number generation process of
Android OS running on the emulator.
Android OS is an open source project designed primarily for touchscreen de-
vices. It is derived from the Linux OS which is also open source so their kernels
are nearly the same. Although the libraries and basics of Android are written
in C, application software running on an application framework which includes
Java-compatible libraries is based on Apache Harmony. Android uses the Dalvik
virtual machine with just-in-time compilation to run Dalvik dex-code (Dalvik
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Executable), which is usually translated from Java bytecode. Therefore, top-
level implementation of random number process of Android is written in Java.
Android has SecureRandom class for generating cryptographically secure ran-
dom numbers. This generation process is totally deterministic if input-seed is
known. Input-seed comes from the kernel part of random number generation
process. Therefore, in order to analyze the security of random number generator
of Android, we examine Android kernel. Android uses slightly modified Linux
kernel; but their random number generation processes are the same. Because of
this reason, by analyzing Android RNG, we also analyze Linux RNG.
During the analysis process, first we download Android source code and de-
tect the parts that are related to random number generation. After viewing these
parts, we see that the main source comes from kernel. Then, we download An-
droid kernel source code and search the same parts, specifically random.c class.
In order to understand how the system works better, we modify this class so that
some intermediate outputs give additional information about the random number
generation process after examining the source code,.
Subsequently, we apply some tests on kernel to evaluate its reliability in calcu-
lation of entropy estimation, because the heart of the system lies on the entropy
estimator; i.e. the calculated amount of the entropy decides the quality of the
random number generator outputs. As it will be explained later, we could not
find any obvious weakness of the estimator.
1.1 Background
Randomness is a crucial resource for cryptography, and random number genera-
tors are critical building blocks of almost all cryptographic systems. Therefore,
random number generation is one of the key parts of secure communication. Prob-
lematic random number generation process may result in breaking the encrypted
communication channel, because the encryption keys are obtained by using the
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random numbers. For computers and smart devices, generation of random num-
bers is handled by operating systems because of the fact that obtaining truly
random numbers from the physical sources is a costly method. Digital devices
are fully deterministic machines but unpredictability is still required for cryp-
tography, security, randomized algorithms, scheduling and networking; therefore,
some modifications and additions are needed in order to construct random num-
ber generators using these machines.
There are basic requirements recommended by [6] that random number gener-
ators must hold even if the attacker knows the code of the generator, and/or has
partial knowledge of the entropy used for refreshing the generator’s state. These
requirements can be listed as follows:
Pseudorandomness (Resilience) : The generator’s output looks random to
an observer with no knowledge of the internal state. This property must hold
regardless of that observer’s complete control over data, which is used to refresh
the internal state.
Forward security : An adversary which learns the internal state of the gen-
erator cannot learn anything about previous outputs of the generator. In other
words, past outputs of the generator must look like random to an observer, even
if that observer learns the internal state afterwards.
Backward security (Break-in recovery) : An adversary which learns the state
of the generator cannot learn anything about future outputs of the generator.
Namely, future outputs of the generator looks random, even to an observer with
knowledge of the current state. This property is satisfied by using sufficient
entropy to refresh the generator’s state.
Regarding forward security, note that generator must not leak any informa-
tion about its previous states and outputs. In order to achieve this property, the
methods which are easily calculated in forward direction but cannot be calcu-
lated in the reverse direction must be used. This property is named one-wayness
property and hash functions are example of this family of functions. Backward
security, on the other hand, cannot be satisfied for deterministic functions. Recall
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that, software-based random number generation is just deterministic process and
cannot provide backward security if used alone. In order to eliminate determinis-
tic property of software generators, states of the generators must periodically be
refreshed with sufficiently random external data.
As a concrete example to these properties, Linux RNG can be given. Linux
RNG provides backward security by collecting entropy from several noise sources.
These entropy sources are based on user activity events, such as pressing a key
on a keyboard or moving a mouse, or system events which include interrupts and
hard disk I/O. In order to satisfy forward security property, Linux RNG uses
hash functions between state transitions.
1.2 Attacks on Random Number Generators
Problems in random number generators may cause very critical security flaws. In
this section, critical attacks on random number generators will be listed.
1.2.1 Attack to Netscape Browser’s SSL Implementation
SSL implementation of Netscape’s Solaris 2.4 browser has weakness on random
number generator as described in [7]. It was discovered that Netscape browsers
generated SSL session keys using second, microsecond, process ID and parent
process ID as seed, as shown in Code 1.1. After a seed is obtained, generating
encryption key is a totally deterministic process as shown in Code 1.2. Therefore,
security of the encryption scheme relies on the security of the seed. However, a
seed is guessable for an attacker who has an account on the UNIX machine
running the Netscape browser, and likewise for an attacker who does not have
an account. Former group can learn process ID and parent process ID by simply
logging into the system. Then, in order to learn time value, attacker just uses
Ethernet sniffing tools to see precise time of each packet and by using this he
can guess the time of day on the system running the Netscape browser to within
4
global variable seed;
RNG_CreateContext ()
/* Time elapsed since 1970 */
(seconds , microseconds) = time of day;
pid = process ID; ppid = parent process ID;
a = mklcpr(microseconds);
b = mklcpr(pid + seconds + (ppid << 12));
seed = MD5(a, b);
/* not cryptographically significant; shown for
completeness */
mklcpr(x)
return ((0 xDEECE66D * x + 0x2BBB62DC) >> 1);
/* a very good standard mixing function , source omitted */
MD5()
Code 1.1: The Netscape v1.1 seeding process: pseudocode. Only unknowns are
second, microsecond, pid and ppid values for attacker.
a second. After that, he can easily guess microsecond value by brute-forcing—
there are only one million possibilities. For the latter group, attack is more
complicated. In particular, even though the pid and ppid are 15 bit quantities on
most UNIX machines, the sum pid + (ppid  12) has only 27 bits, not 30. If the
value of seconds is known, variable a has only 20 unknown bits, and variable b has
only 27 unknown bits. This leaves, at most, 47 bits of randomness in the secret
key, a far cry from the 128-bit security claimed by the domestic U.S. version.
An ironic aspect should be mentioned at this point. Unfortunate for Netscape,
U.S. regulations prohibit the export of products incorporating strong cryptog-
raphy. In order to distribute an international version of its browser overseas,
Netscape had to weaken the encryption scheme to use keys of just 40 bits, which
is even less than 47 bits of randomness in Netscape domestic version due to the
weaknesses in the implementation.
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RNG_GenerateRandomBytes ()
x = MD5(seed);
seed = seed + 1;
return x;
global variable challenge , secret_key;
create_key ()
RNG_CreateContext ();
tmp = RNG_GenerateRandomBytes ();
tmp = RNG_GenerateRandomBytes ();
challenge = RNG_GenerateRandomBytes ();
secret_key = RNG_GenerateRandomBytes ();
Code 1.2: The Netscape v1.1 key-generation process: pseudocode. If seed is
known, key generation is totally deterministic.
1.2.2 Attack to Kerberos v4 Session Keys
An attack similar to the one on Netscape was demonstrated in 1997, on the MIT
implementation of the Kerberos 4.0 authentication protocol [1]. Kerberos Version
4 uses the UNIX random function to produce the random DES keys. Kerberos
generates a random DES key by first seeding the random number generator with
a seed chosen as in Algorithm 1.1, then it makes two calls to the random function
to get 64 pseudorandom bits. 56-bit DES key is extracted from this 64-bit block.
The random function relies on a 32-bit seed value to determine the internal state
for generating the pseudorandom numbers. Thus, any sequence of numbers cre-
ated by this random function, no matter how long they are, has an entropy of
only 32 bits. Likewise the Kerberos session keys have an entropy of only 32 bits.
By improving the attack, attack complexity can be reduced to 220. As it was
mentioned the only component of the seed that significantly changes between
successive key generations is the microseconds value. This yields a key entropy
of about 20 bits. Unlike the low-order 20 bits, the first 12 bits rarely change and
are predictable; because the values other than microsecond values do not change
very much. This can be seen graphically in Figure 1.1. As a result of this poor
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time = time -of -day seconds since UTC 0:00 Jan. 1, 1970
pid = process ID of the Kerberos server process
keyCount = cumulative count of session keys generated
fTime = fractional part of time -of-day seconds since UTC
0:00 Jan. I, 1970 in microseconds
hid = hostid of the machine on which the Kerberos server is
running
seed = time ⊕ pid ⊕ keyCount ⊕ fTime ⊕ hid
Note that all values are 32-bits
Algorithm 1.1: Kerberos v4 seed generation algorithm. fTime is the most chang-
ing value, it determines unpredictability.
choice in seed values, given knowledge of the approximate time that a key was
generated, there are only about 220 (or approximately one million) possible keys.
Figure 1.1: Kerberos random number generator seed (reprinted from [1]). Only
lower 20 bits are unpredictable which reduces attack complexity to 220
1.2.3 Attack to Shuﬄing Algorithm of Online Poker
In 1999, Software Security Group from Reliable Software Technologies analyzed
the published shuﬄing algorithm of PlanetPoker [5]. It is found that the algorithm
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used by ASF Software, Inc., the company that produces the software used by most
of the online poker games, including PlanetPoker Internet cardroom, suffered from
many flaws. Published shuﬄing code is Code 1.3.
First problem found by [5] was about the shuﬄing of the last card in the deck.
Unlike most Pascal functions, the function Random(n ) actually returns a number
between 0 and n-1 instead of a number between 1 and n. Hence, random number
in Code 1.3 is set to a value between 1 and 51. In short, the algorithm never
chooses to swap the current card with the last card. When ctr finally reaches
the last card, 52, that card is swapped with any other card except itself. Namely,
this shuﬄing algorithm never allows the 52nd card to end up in the 52nd place.
This is an obvious, but easily correctable, violation of fairness.
Reliable Software Technologies Software Security Group found the shuﬄing
method as second problem in the algorithm [5]. In the original shuﬄing algorithm,
each card i is swapped with a card from the range [1, n]. This causes uneven
probabilities for card positions in the deck; because, number of total probabilities
is nn whereas the number of possible distributions of the deck is just n!. In [5],
this problem is illustrated for n = 3 case. To solve this problem, swapping each
card i with a card from the range [i, n] is suggested as solution. This change is
important because the n! number of distributions means that the new shuﬄing
algorithm generates each possible deck only once. Notice that each possible shuﬄe
is produced once and only once so that each deck has an equal probability of
occurring. Now that’s fair!
Last problem found by [5] is about our main topic, random number generation.
Recall that in a real deck of cards, there are 52! (approximately 2226) possible
unique shuﬄes. Also recall that the seed for a 32-bit random number generator
must be a 32-bit number, meaning that there are just over four billion possible
seeds. Since the deck is reinitialized and the generator re-seeded before each
shuﬄe, only four billion possible shuﬄes can result from this algorithm. Four
billion possible shuﬄes is alarmingly less than 52!. Now, the worse part comes.
Pascal function Randomize() chooses a seed based on the number of milliseconds
since midnight thus the number of possible decks now reduces to 86,400,000—the
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procedure TDeck.Shuffle;
var
ctr: Byte;
tmp: Byte;
random_number: Byte;
begin
{ Fill the deck with unique cards }
for ctr := 1 to 52 do
Card[ctr] := ctr;
{ Generate a new seed based on the system clock }
randomize;
{ Randomly rearrange each card }
for ctr := 1 to 52 do begin
random_number := random (51) +1;
tmp := card[random_number ];
card[random_number] := card[ctr];
card[ctr] := tmp;
end;
CurrentCard := 1;
JustShuffled := True;
end;
Code 1.3: The flawed ASF shuﬄing algorithm (taken from [5]). The algorithm
starts by initializing an array with values in order from 1 to 52, representing
the 52 possible cards. Then, the program initializes a pseudorandom number
generator using the system clock with a call to Randomize(). The actual shuﬄe
is performed by swapping every position in the array, in turn, with a randomly
chosen position. The position to swap with is chosen by calls to the pseudo-
random number generator.
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Start with fresh Deck
Get random seed
For CT = 1, While CT <= 52, Do
X = Random number between CT and 52, inclusive
Swap Deck[CT] with Deck[X]
Algorithm 1.2: Pseudocode of secure shuﬄing algorithm (taken from [5]). By
using securely seeded random number generator, swap each card CT with a
card from the range [CT, 52]. This simple card-shuﬄing algorithm, when paired
with the right random number generator, produces decks of cards with an even
distribution.
number of milliseconds in a day. 86 million is alarmingly less than 52!. In [5],
the worse of the worse case was found. By synchronizing their program with the
system clock on the server generating the pseudorandom number, they were able
to reduce the number of possible combinations down to a number on the order of
200,000 possibilities. After that move, the system was captured, since searching
through this tiny set of shuﬄes is trivial and can be done on a PC in real time.
As a solution to all of the problems described above, the algorithm in Algo-
rithm 1.2 is suggested. This solution comes from the analogy between crypto-
graphic key length (which is directly proportional to the strength of many cryp-
tographic algorithms) and the size of the random seed that is used to produce a
shuﬄed deck of cards.
1.2.4 Attack to Java Session-ID Generation
More recently, RNG used by Tomcat, the Apache Java Servlet, in the Java
Servlets mechanism is analyzed and it has been shown how someone can exploit
a flaw in the implementation of Java Servlet session-ID to impersonate another
client [8]. Since HTTP is stateless, the method must be implemented to manage
sessions between the client and the server. Many commercial sites use mecha-
nisms like cookies and URL rewriting which are both based on session-ID to keep
a session state at the client side. The reason why sessions should be stateful is
that it makes keeping track of shopping baskets, customer preferences, previous
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transactions and many other things possible. Hence session ID is important and
it is the only thing represents client; i.e. an attacker can impersonate the client if
he obtains session-ID of the client. In order to prevent impersonation and session
stealing, the server generates a session-ID token, represented by a large random
number. An impersonator should have difficulty guessing the correct token, be-
cause of the large search space. This is true only if the RNG generating that
token is strong.
Gutterman and Malkhi analyzed Java Virtual Machine PRNG (Pseu-
dorandom Number Generator), used by Tomcat servers to generate ses-
sion ID tokens [8]. It uses two methods for random number genera-
tion. First method used by Tomcat servers depends on /dev/random
and the attack is not applicable for this case. Second method is Java
PRNG and it has two versions, one is java.util.Random, and the other
is java.security.SecureRandom. The former is LCG (Linear Congruen-
tial Generator) while the latter is a stronger PRNG with a 160-bit state,
and uses SHA-1 for transition function. Both generate random numbers re-
cursively, starting with an initial seed. This seed has two entropy inputs
which are toString() value of org.apache.catalina.session.ManagerBase
and time-of-day of the server’s uptime in milliseconds. If server’s uptime
is guessable in an accuracy of day, then it will have 226 possible values.
As a worst case scenario, if server’s uptime is guessable in an accuracy of
year, then it will have 235 possible values. Other entropy input, which is
toString() method from Java Objects Class, returns a String whose value
is getClass().getName()+"@"+Integer.toHexString(hashCode()). Only the
result of the method hashCode() is not fixed in the result. When examining
the method hashCode(), Gutterman and Malkhi discovered that some imple-
mentations (e.g. the Microsoft Windows platform) use LCG. This makes the
hashCode() value predictable. In practice, they show that this value contributes
not more than 8 unpredictable bits. As a result, in order to guess and steal the
session-ID, attacker needs only 234 - 243 guesses which is feasible on a home com-
puter. After correctly estimating the session-ID, an attacker can impersonate the
client.
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MD_Update (&m,buf ,j);
[ ... ]
MD_Update (&m,buf ,j); /* purify complains */
Code 1.4: Debian code lines before change. As it can be seen, there is a comment
indicating Purify tools gives warnings at this line.
/*
* Don’t add uninitialised data.
MD_Update (&m,buf ,j);
*/
[ ... ]
/*
* Don’t add uninitialised data.
MD_Update (&m,buf ,j); /* purify complains
*/
Code 1.5: Debian code lines after change. Recall that the lines causing warnings
by Purify are commented out.
1.2.5 Random Number Bug on Debian OpenSSL
In 2008, Luciano Bello discovered that the random number generator in Debian’s
OpenSSL package is predictable [9]. Cryptographic key material may be guessable
because of an incorrect Debian-specific change to the OpenSSL package. The bug
in question was caused by the removal of the lines which resulted in the Valgrind
and Purify tools to produce warnings about the use of uninitialized data in any
code that was linked to OpenSSL [10]. The initial code snippet Code 1.4 is
changed to Code 1.5 in order to eliminate the warnings. Removing this code has
negatively affected the seeding process for the OpenSSL PRNG. Instead of mixing
in random data for the initial seed, the only random value that was used became
the current process ID. This resulted in a very small number of seed values being
used for all PRNG operations such as key generation.
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1.2.6 Hacking of PlayStation 3 Root Key
In December 2010, a group of coders operating under the name Fail0verflow had
managed to exploit a weakness in the PlayStation 3’s encryption system, thereby
gaining the root key required to run any software on the machine [11]. Sony uses
digital signature to check whether the firmware and files are modified and valid.
The software and files must be signed with Sony’s private key in order to run on
Sony PlayStation. This is not possible without knowing the private key. Sony
used Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for signing purpose
and ECDSA has a property such that if there are two files signed with the same
key, then it is possible to extract that key. The weakness lies right here. Normally,
private key is randomly generated and there is no way that someone can guess,
calculate, or use a timing attack, or any other type of attack in order to find
that private key. However Sony made a huge mistake in their implementation,
they used the same private key everywhere, which means that if you have two
signatures, both with the same key, then you can calculate the key using two
signatures. After calculating the key, any software can be run on PlayStation.
Choosing a constant value for private key is a huge mistake in cryptography, and
concrete example of this mistake and its results are illustrated in this section.
1.2.7 Common Factors of RSA Keys
The most widely used cryptosystem for authentication purpose is RSA. The RSA
cryptosystem is intended to be based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers.
An RSA public key consists of a pair of integers: an encryption exponent e and a
modulus N, which is a large integer that itself is the product of two large primes, p
and q. If an adversary can factor this integer N back into its prime factors p and
q, then the adversary can decrypt any messages encrypted using this public key.
However, even using the fastest known factoring algorithm, to public knowledge
nobody has yet been able to factor a 1024-bit RSA modulus.
It is vitally important to the security of the keys that they are generated using
random inputs. If the inputs used to generate the keys were not random, then an
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adversary may be able to guess those inputs and thus recover the keys without
having to laboriously factor N. In February 2012, two groups of researchers re-
vealed that large numbers of RSA encryption keys that are actively used on the
Internet can be cracked because the random numbers used to generate these keys
were not random enough [12, 13].
This problem and the reasons are discussed in Section 3.2.
1.3 Related Work
Having mentioned some flaws related to random number generator, the works on
the analysis of random number generator of operating systems will be discussed
in this section.
1.3.1 Analysis of Windows RNG
Windows is not an open source operating system; therefore, analysis of its func-
tions and executables requires a lot of effort and patience. After reverse engineer-
ing part, analysis part takes a vast amount of time. Despite all the difficulties,
the pseudorandom number generator used by Microsoft in Windows were ana-
lyzed in [14, 15]. CryptGenRandom function in Windows 2000 has been analyzed
and its operation was revealed without assistance from Microsoft. As a result, it
was shown that random number generation in Windows 2000 is far from being
genuinely random — or even pseudorandom. These flaws exist even in Windows
XP but they were solved after Windows XP SP3 by changing random number
generation algorithm.
It has been found that the WRNG has a complex and layered architecture
which includes entropy rekeying every 128 KBytes of output which means that
WRNG does not use entropy measurements and is, therefore, not blocking. Also
WRNG uses RC4 and SHA-1 as building blocks, but RC4 does not provide any
forward security. Therefore, the attacker can learn future outputs in O(1) time
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and compute past outputs in O(223) time. Given how the operating system
operates the generator, this means that a single attack reveals 128 KBytes of
generator output for every process. Another property of WRNG is that it runs
in user mode rather than in kernel mode; hence, it is easy to access its state even
without administrator privileges. The last important property of WRNG is that
it keeps a different instance of the generator for every process; i.e. every process
has its own random number pool.
1.3.2 Analysis of Linux RNG
The earliest analysis on Linux RNG is roughly done in [16]. In this work, re-
lated Linux RNG is described with their main components and highly shallow
explanations.
The first comprehensive analysis and examination of Linux RNG is done in [4].
In this thesis, Linux kernel version 2.6.10 is studied. There did not exist a detailed
description of the random number generation process before this study; the codes
were analyzed statically and dynamically by simulating the code in user mode.
After these works, critical flaws have been found and they are described in a more
technical manner in [17]. The authors demonstrated an attack on the forward
security of the generator, with an overhead of 264 in most cases and an overhead
of 296 in other cases. Additionally, they showed that blocking the /dev/random
device permanently is possible by reading from it excessively. Moreover they
showed that Linux RNG implementation on the wireless routers may be weak
because they do not have enough entropy inputs.
The problems in the wireless routers are examined deeply in [18]. Different
wireless routers are investigated for entropy sources and their random number
output sequences. The current thesis furthermore reviews random number gener-
ator in Linux kernel version 2.6.22 is reviewed and compares it with the generator
in Linux kernel 2.4 series.
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Until [19], the works on Linux RNG are only review of the code; there was
not any theoretical analogy for the process. In this paper, the stages of random
number generator in Linux kernel version 2.6.30.7 are theoretically and mathe-
matically studied.
In [20], entropy estimator of Linux RNG is interpreted as polynomial inter-
polation. This interpretation is explained in Chapter 4.
Entropy transfers on different types of machines are studied thoroughly in [21].
It is found that the major entropy provider is disk and major consumer of the
random numbers is kernel itself.
Because of the early random generation on Linux systems, same private keys
are generated worldwide [12, 13]. The reason is insufficient entropy and this
problem is discussed in Section 3.2.
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Chapter 2
Android RNG
”Any one who consider
arithmetical methods of
producing random digits is, of
course, in a state of sin.”
—John von Neumann
In this section, we will describe general Android RNG structure, its basis on
Java.Security.SecureRandom implementation and link with Linux kernel RNG.
Before describing Android random number generation, it will be helpful to
introduce some basics of Linux RNG using the comments in [22]. Linux RNG
has three output interfaces. First one is void get random bytes(void *buf,
int nbytes) which is used within the kernel and this method produces random
outputs for intra-kernel processes.
The other two interfaces are two character devices /dev/random (blocking)
and and /dev/urandom (nonblocking). First one is suitable for cryptographic
usage; it will only return a maximum of the number of bits of randomness (as
estimated by the random number generator) contained in the entropy pool. If
there is not enough randomness in the pool, then it will block the process until the
sufficient entropy is collected in the pool. The second device does not have this
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limit, and will return as many bytes as are requested. If randomness is not enough,
then it will not stop producing random numbers; new outputs will be merely
cryptographically strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
After necessary background for Linux RNG is explained, now Android
RNG can be explained. As described in [23], Android Operating System has
java.util.Random class for random number generation purposes; this class re-
turns pseudorandom values. However, this class is not proper to use for cryp-
tographic purposes. There is java.security.SecureRandom class which ex-
tends formerly mentioned java.util.Random to generate cryptographically se-
cure pseudorandom numbers.
2.1 General Structure of Android RNG
We examined the sources firstly in order to analyze random number generation
process. In the source code of SecureRandom.java, there is no explicit algorithm
defined; this class uses predefined algorithms to generate random numbers. These
predefined algorithms are provided by different Service Providers which must ex-
tend SecureRandomSpi.java class. There is a default Service Provider Interface
in Android source codes: SHA1PRNG SecureRandomImpl.java.
In the description of SHA1PRNG SecureRandomImpl.java class, it is said that
generation of pseudorandom bits is performed by using the implementation tech-
nique described in Random Number Generator (RNG) algorithms section in Ap-
pendix A of [24] and the algorithm is named SHA1PRNG. In the description, it
is claimed that SHA1PRNG implementation follows the IEEE P1363 standard,
Appendix G.7: Expansion of source bits, and uses SHA-1 as the foundation of the
PRNG. It computes the SHA-1 hash over a true-random seed value concatenated
with a 64-bit counter which is incremented by one for each operation. From the
160-bit SHA-1 output, only 64 bits are used. So it can be said that SHA1PRNG is
a somewhat secure and totally deterministic algorithm, i.e. although it provides
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private static final String DEVICE_NAMES[ ] =
{ "/dev/urandom" /*, "/dev/random" */ };
Code 2.1: Android RNG uses only /dev/random. Recall that /dev/random is
commented out.
forward security thanks to one-wayness property of SHA1 algorithm, it does not
provide backward security.
The only input which makes SHA1PRNG produce different output sequences
is its seed. This seed can be provided manually; however it is dangerous to seed
SecureRandom with the current time because current time value is more pre-
dictable to an attacker than the default seed. Therefore, the default is generally
used in SHA1PRNG algorithm.
Default seed is provided by getRandomBits method of RandomBitsSupplier
class. In the class description it is indicated that the source for true random bits
is either one of Linux’s devices: /dev/urandom or /dev/random. The source for
true random bits depends on which one is available; if both of them are available,
then the first one is used. However, /dev/random is commented out in line 70 of
RandomBitsSupplier.java as shown in Code 2.1.
Although /dev/urandom alone is not safe enough to use for cryptographic pur-
poses, this may not cause any crucial problem; because outputs of /dev/urandom
is used as seed for cryptographically secure PRNG of Java-Android. Further-
more, in embedded devices, /dev/urandom is generally used as the only source
for random numbers [18].
The fact that even Android’s secure random generator is using /dev/urandom
arises the question of whether /dev/random is used in any program. As indicated
in [25], JVM relies on /dev/random by default for UNIX platforms. However, this
can potentially block some processes; because, on Linux, /dev/random waits for a
certain amount of entropy to be collected on the host machine before returning a
result. Although /dev/random is more secure, using /dev/urandom is preferable
if the default JVM configuration delays on some processes [25].
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After these discussions on security of /dev/urandom, one can wonder if there
is any module in Android which uses it to generate random numbers, other than
SecureRandom.java. IBM Application Security Research Group discovered a
very interesting vulnerability in Android’s DNS resolver [26], a weakness in its
pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), res randomid(), which makes DNS
poisoning attacks feasible. DNS poisoning attacks endanger the confidentiality
and integrity of the target machine. For instance, DNS poisoning can be used to
steal the victim’s cookies, or tamper with weak applications’ update mechanisms
in order to execute malicious code. After Android version 4.1.1, in order to
eliminate this vulnerability, random numbers are now taken from /dev/urandom
which should have enough entropy when the call is made [26].
At this point, it can be seen that security of Android RNG relies on the secu-
rity of Linux RNG; i.e. outputs of /dev/urandom. If the outputs of Linux RNG
can be predicted, then Android RNG would be totally deterministic. As a result,
there will be no cryptographically secure random numbers that applications can
use.
2.2 Linux RNG - v2.6.29
We have two options for Android kernel versions: 2.6.29 and 3.4. For version
3.4, compilation could not be completed; therefore, we study random number
generator in Linux kernel version 2.6.29 in this thesis.
There are three different pools-state vectors in the random number generator
system: input pool (512 bytes), blocking pool /dev/random (128 bytes), and
nonblocking pool /dev/urandom (128 bytes). Entropy provided from disk events,
user inputs and interrupts affect the input pool. Outputs are read from the
output pools which are /dev/random and /dev/urandom. Also there are transfer
events between input pool and output pools. All these structures, which are all
elements and processes in Linux RNG are shown in Figure 2.1.
Now, Linux RNG can be described in parts.
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Figure 2.1: Linux RNG full scheme. Entropy is collected from the entropy sources.
Then this entropy is mixed into the input pool while estimating its randomness.
Random numbers are extracted from the pools using extraction algorithms. Dur-
ing extraction, there is also feedback portion to ensure forward security. After
extracting from input pool, random numbers are mixed into the secondary pools:
blocking and nonblocking pools. Requested random numbers are extracted from
blocking pool or nonblocking pool with respect to requester interface.
2.2.1 Initialization
When Linux random number generator is initialized, the contents of all pools
(input, blocking and nonblocking) and their entropy counts are reset to zero.
Then all the pools are mixed with their individual initialization time and system
constant. This procedure will be described in Section 3.2.
At the startup, Linux boot process does not provide much entropy in the
different sources available to the RNG. Therefore, the designer of the Linux
RNG recommends a script which generates data from /dev/urandom and saves
it in a file, and writes the saved data to /dev/urandom at startup [22]. This
mixes the same data into nonblocking pool and its initial entropy increases
although its entropy counter is still zero. If this is not possible, for exam-
ple in Live CD systems, the nonblocking random number generator should
be used with caution directly after the boot process since it might not con-
tain enough entropy. Recall that this script may solve the detected problems
21
in [12, 13, 18] which are described in Section 3.2. Android developers pro-
vide more randomness during initialization by applying this recommendation.
/frameworks/base/services/java/com/android/server/EntropyService.java
file in Android source is a service designed to load and periodically save random-
ness for the Linux kernel.
2.2.2 Entropy Collection
There are three sources of entropy: disk, interrupts, and user-input. Randomness
from these inputs are collected continuously and used to mix the input pool. In
this section, entropy formation and collection will be explained.
Interrupt randomness is collected via add interrupt randomness function
in random.c. This function is called by interrupt service routines and receives
the interrupt number as a parameter. The type of entropy event is calculated
by adding 0x100 to the interrupt number. The resulting value and timing in-
formation is passed to the add timer randomness function, which adds the en-
tropy to the input pool. However, there are many interrupts which come reg-
ularly to the system and these interrupts do not make the system random;
i.e. they do not provide random inputs, they can be estimated easily. There-
fore, each device driver can define whether its interrupts are suitable as entropy
inputs, by adding the IRQF SAMPLE RANDOM flag to the corresponding handler.
However, this flag has been scheduled for removal since 2009 (as stated in the
feature-removal-schedule.txt file within the kernel source tree), due to sev-
eral misuses. With kernel version 3.6, it is removed completely. For interrupt
randomness, a new pool, named fast pool, is defined and interrupt randomness
mixes that new pool directly instead of mixing the input pool.
Disk randomness is collected via add disk randomness function in random.c.
This function is called after completion of a disk I/O operation. The type of
entropy event is calculated as in Algorithm 2.1.
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type -value = 0x100 + (( major << 20) | minor)
Algorithm 2.1: Disk randomness calculation. type value is dependent on only
major and minor value of the related disk; therefore, the different values it can
take does not exceed eight on average machines.
num = (type << 4) ⊕ code ⊕ (code >> 4) ⊕ value
Algorithm 2.2: Input randomness calculation. Although all type, code, and value
are sixteen-bits length, unknown bits in num is eight for keyboard and twelve for
mouse interrupts as shown in Table 2.1
The resulting value is passed to the add timer randomness function together
with timing information. It can be seen that different accesses to the same disk
will result in the same type of entropy event. Also assuming an average machine
has no more than eight disks, the type-value actual span is limited to three bits.
Input randomness is collected via add input randomness function in
random.c. This function is called sequential to one of the input events
occurs. The type of entropy event indicates whether an event is related
to a key, button, mouse or touchpad. These event codes are defined in
/usr/include/linux/input.h. The function checks for repeating events (with
same value), and avoids using them for entropy collection. The type, code, and
value of the input events are mixed to get the type of entropy event using the algo-
rithm in Algorithm 2.2. The result value is passed to the add timer randomness
function together with timing information.
Table 2.1 taken from [17] presents the number of unknown bits for each type
of event. Note that the actual entropy of these events is much lower, as most
of them are predictable to a large extent. However, timing information increases
the uncertainty, thereby the security.
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Keyboard Mouse Hard-Drive Interrupts
8 12 3 4
Table 2.1: The number of unknown bits in operating system events (taken from
[4]). Actual entropy from these events is much lower, hence LRNG uses timing
information to increase uncertainity.
Let en denote the n
th event and tn denote its timing.
Define the variables below:
first level delta : δn = tn - tn−1
second level delta : δ2n = δn - δn−1
third level delta: δ3n = δ
2
n - δ
2
n−1
All of tn, δn, δ
2
n and δ
3
n are 32-bit long.
Entropy added by en = min(log2(min(δn, δ
2
n, δ
3
n)) ,11)
Algorithm 2.3: Entropy estimation algorithm. Three levels of time differences
are calculated and logarithm of minimum of these values is taken as entropy
estimation.
2.2.3 Entropy Estimation
After collecting entropy from the disk, user, or interrupts; add timer randomness
is called. In this function, timing information and the return values
of the preceding functions (add disk randomness, add input randomness
and add interrupt randomness) are combined and this result is passed to
mix pool bytes function which mixes the pool. Beside this task, entropy is
estimated using timing information in this function.
The LRNG estimates the amount of entropy of an event as a function of its
timing only, and not of the event type. The reason for choosing this calculation
method and how it works will be explained in Chapter 4. The estimation of the
entropy provided by the events is handled using the Algorithm 2.3.
As it can be seen from Algorithm 2.3; initially, three levels of δ (time differ-
ence) are calculated for each particular event. After this step, minimum of those
three level δ is taken and logarithm of the least significant eleven bits of chosen
δ is returned as entropy estimation.
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2.2.4 Entropy Addition and Mixing the Pool
As it is indicated, add timer randomness function prepares the input for
mix pool bytes function whose task is adding the entropy by mixing the pool.
This procedure mixes one byte at a time by first extending it to a 32-bit word,
then rotating it by a changing factor and finally mixing it in the pool by us-
ing a twisted generalized feedback shift register(TGFSR) [27]. For this purpose,
each pool maintains a primitive polynomial. The input pool’s polynomial is
x128 + x103 + x76 + x51 + x25 + x + 1. The blocking and nonblocking pool
have the same polynomial: x32 + x26 + x20 + x14 + x7 + x + 1. There is
also twist table, whose values are 0, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278. All of these processes
are shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Linux RNG mixing function. Mixing function is similar to general
TGFSR structure. Input data is rotated by the changing rotation value and ⊕’ed
with the values from the pool which are taken with respect to pool’s polynomial
and current index. Then lowest three bits are used as indices for twist table. The
value from twist table and remaining 29 bits are ⊕’ed and result is written into
the current index.
This entropy addition process is mostly similar to TGFSR but there is a
difference; new state depends not only on the previous state, but also on the
input entropy word. Due to this difference, some properties of TGFSR cannot
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be applied anymore; i.e. the process is no longer a linear function, and the
long period cannot be guaranteed [17]. Moreover polynomial of this TGFSR is
examined in [19] and it is found that the polynomial is not irreducible. Thus,
the resulting TGFSR does not achieve maximum period. However, this does not
cause any practical attack on the system.
In short, mixing algorithm is designed so that it can diffuse entropy into the
pool and no entropy gets lost. Note that the exact details of the entropy addition
algorithm do not affect the results that we show in this thesis.
2.2.5 Entropy Extraction
When random number output is needed from blocking or nonblocking pool; or
when entropy transfer is needed from input pool; entropy extraction routine whose
name is extract entropy is called. When it is called, it returns the requested
number of bits by calling extract buf several times. Extraction algorithm runs
under extract buf function.
Extraction algorithm starts with generating a hash across the pool; 16 words
(512 bits) at a time. After generating the hash to whole pool, resulting hash
is mixed back into the pool in order to prevent backtracking attacks (where the
attacker knows the state of the pool with the current outputs, and attempts to
find previous outputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. After mixing,
16-word portion of the pool is taken from the pool and its hash is calculated
(maintaining to chaining hash). In case the hash function has some recognizable
output pattern, resulting hash is folded in half. In order to fold the output of
hash function; first word is ⊕’ed with fifth word, second word is ⊕’ed with fourth
word and first two bytes of third word is ⊕’ed with last two bytes of third word.
The result of folded hash is output of extraction process which has 10-byte size.
Linux RNG uses SHA1 as hash function in this process. Each SHA1 block
has size of 512 bits; therefore pool is hashed 16 words (512 bits) at a time. The
output and internal states of SHA1 have size of 20 bytes which means that 20
26
byte hash value is mixed into the pool during the extraction process. Finally,
hash output is folded into half and 10 byte-sized extraction output is obtained.
2.2.6 Entropy Accounting
Up to this point, the main parts of the Linux random number generator are
described. In order for these processes to work properly, some auxiliary functions
and variables are needed. The most important one is entropy estimation variable
for each pool and accounting functions for this variable. When entropy is added to
the pool, entropy estimation of that pool is increased by the entropy estimation of
input. This is done in credit entropy store function. Similarly, when entropy
is extracted from the pool, entropy estimation of that pool is decreased by the
entropy estimation of output. This is done in account function. In light of this
information, these auxiliary variables and functions will be examined in the same
order of explanation of Linux random number generator’s main functions.
When pools are initialized, entropy estimation is set to zero for each pool.
Mixing the pool with time and system constant does not increase the entropy
estimation of the pools.
During the entropy collection process, after collecting the events, entropy
estimation of related event is calculated and then input pool is mixed with related
event input. At the same time, entropy estimation of the input pool is increased
by the entropy estimation of the event; i.e. the amount of the incrementation is
between 0 and 11 bits. In other words, entropy estimation function works only
for the input pool.
After collecting entropy in the input pool, some entropy is transferred to the
secondary pools—blocking pool and nonblocking pool—when requested. This
transfer process is defined in xfer secondary pool function. Subsequent to doing
some necessary checks, requested amount of entropy is transferred from input pool
to one of the secondary pools. For example, if 8-byte entropy is needed, 64 bits
of entropy is decreased from the input pool and the same amount of entropy is
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added to the requester pool. Recall that, extract entropy function is called
for the input pool during the extraction of entropy from the input pool and
mix pool bytes function is called for the requester pool during the mixing the
requested amount of entropy bits.
Similar progress is valid for outputting random number process. When a user
or kernel function requests output from random number generator, output bits
are extracted from the related secondary pool and its entropy is decreased by the
amount of entropy given to the requester.
Similar to the initialization process, writing to /dev/random or /dev/random
increases the randomness of blocking and nonblocking pools respectively. How-
ever, this does not increase entropy estimation of the related pool similar to the
initialization events.
2.3 Linux RNG - After v2.6.29
There are lots of different kernel versions in [22] and many of the major versions
are still under development. For example, on April 29th, 2013, kernel versions
2.6.34 series, 3.0 series, 3.2 series, 3.4 series, 3.8 series and 3.9 series were still
improving and changing independently. Therefore, bigger major version num-
ber may not mean newer kernel version. In this section, initially two different
emulated-Android kernel versions will be described: v2.6.29 and v3.4.0. Then
changes to Linux RNG will be represented cumulatively. First and the biggest
modification is realized with version 3.4.9. After this version, there is not any ma-
jor modification in terms of algorithm. The newest kernel versions 3.0.75, 3.2.44,
3.4.42, 3.6.11, 3.7.10, 3.8.10 and 3.9.0 have nearly the same algorithm, there are
just minor modifications which does not change the running of the main cores of
the RNG algorithm.
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2.3.1 Differences between v2.6.29 and v3.4.0
In version 3.4.0; if there is an architectural random number generator installed
on the system, then this is used in get random bytes interface instead of using
nonblocking pool as random number source. This architectural random number
generator uses RDRAND instruction (Intel R© Secure Key, previously code-named
Bull Mountain Technology) to generate random numbers. If supported, this is
a high bandwidth, cryptographically secure hardware random number genera-
tor as shown in Figure 2.3 taken from [2]. In order to provide the security of
random number generators, it should be resistive to the attacks. From this per-
spective, Intel RNG crypto and classifier blocks can always be built to thwart
timing and power analysis attacks [28]. Furthermore, Intel RNG is also resis-
tive against power glitching attacks; i.e. RNG turns itself off when voltage or
temperature goes out of spec, re-initializes itself when power and voltage return
to spec [28]. Beside the attack protection, Intel RNG uses built-in self-tests to
evaluate whether the blocks implementing the RNG are operating correctly [28].
Additionally, this hardware-based random number generator is used in
add timer randomness to set cycles to any random value instead of getting its
value from CPU. Recall that jiffies are still taken from CPU, because that value
is used in entropy estimation process.
Another change in version 3.4.0 is that output of extract buf is compared
with its previous output. If they are the same, kernel panic message appears to
indicate the problem.
Last but not least, if supported, hardware-based random number generator is
used in initial mixing process instead of constant system value.
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Figure 2.3: Intel’s Bull Mountain random number generator (taken from [2]).
Intel’s new hardware RNG uses thermal noise as source, after applying three layers
it outputs secure random numbers which can be requested by RdRand instruction.
2.3.2 Differences between v3.4.0 and v3.4.9
With version 3.4.9, hardware-based random number generator output is taken
from get random bytes interface and get random bytes arch interface is cre-
ated for this purpose. Namely, get random bytes will generate software-based
random numbers as before and get random bytes arch will be used for more
secure random number requests.
Another improvement in version 3.4.9 is that if supported, hardware-based
RNG output is ⊕’ed with extract buf output in order to make Linux RNG out-
put more random. After this modification, outputs are totally not guessable even
extract buf function has some recognizable patterns assuming that hardware
random number generator provides secure random numbers.
Furthermore, add device randomness() function is added to Linux RNG.
This function provides device- or boot-specific data and mixes them into the
input and nonblocking pools to help initialize them to unique values. This does
not increase entropy estimation of the pools, but it initializes the pools to different
values for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
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Last change in this version is about adding 128-bits sized new pool to the sys-
tem: fast pool. This pool is designed for interrupt randomness actions. If an
interrupt is received, input to fast pool is formed using interrupt information,
timing information and instruction pointer information. Then input is mixed into
the fast pool using similar algorithm shown in Figure 2.4 which is similar to the
original mixing algorithm. Before this modification, it was too expensive to mix
the input pool on every interrupt. Also flooding the CPU with interrupts could
theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy from a somewhat externally control-
lable source [29]. This modification solves the problem by limiting the interrupt
randomness addition to just once a second or after 128 interrupts, whichever
comes first. When this limit is achieved, all content of fast pool is mixed into
the input pool or nonblocking pool. During initialization procedure, fast pool
is mixed into nonblocking pool in order to provide more secure random in a faster
manner. After initialization, fast pool is mixed into the input pool.
Figure 2.4: Linux RNG fast pool mixing function. The algorithm is very similar
to normal mixing function algorithm. Input data is rotated by the changing
rotation value and ⊕’ed with the content of current index and next index of the
pool. Then lowest three bits are used as index for twist table. The value from
twist table and remaining 29 bits are ⊕’ed and result is written into the current
index.
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2.3.3 Hardware RNG and Linux
As it is explained in the previous section, newer versions of Linux can use
installed hardware based RNG as an assistant to its random number gen-
erator. According to the related documentation in the kernel source files
(/Documentation/hw random.txt), when hardware RNG is available, the de-
vice /dev/hw random is created automatically. The interfaces for reading the
random numbers from this device is provided by the software developed by
hardware producers. These producers for each kernel version can be seen in
/drivers/char/hw random directory of the related source code. Newer kernel
versions provide more variety of hardware RNG. There are interfaces for sup-
ported models of Intel, AMD, Niagara2, VIA, OMAP, PA Semi in kernel version
2.6.29. In the latest kernel version 3.9; the interfaces for supported models of At-
mel, Broadcom, Octeon, Free-Scale, PicoChip, PowerPC and Exynos are added.
Using these interfaces, reading from hardware RNG device /dev/hw random is
simply done by using read() command. Information about installed hardware
RNG on the system can be seen by checking rng available and rng current
attributes in /sys/class/misc/hw random node. The former attribute lists avail-
able hardware-specific drivers and the latter lists the one which is currently con-
nected to /dev/hw random. If the system has more than one RNG available, it is
possible to change the one used by writing a name from the list in rng available
into rng current.
A key advantage of using hardware RNG is performance. Because sampling
an entropy source is typically slow since it often involves device I/O of some type
and often additional waiting for a real-time sampling event to transpire. In con-
trast, hardware RNG computations are fast since they are processor-based and
avoid I/O and entropy source delays. According to [3], since the implementation
of Linux RNG is typically in software, it may be vulnerable to a broad class of
software attacks; i.e. memory-based attacks or timing attacks. Moreover, the
approach does not solve the problem of what entropy source to use. Without an
external source of some type, entropy quality is likely to be poor. For example,
sampling user events (e.g., mouse, keyboard) may be impossible if the system
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resides in a large data center. By asserting these reasons, Digital Random Num-
ber Generator (DRNG) usage is promoted in [3]. Cascade construction RNG
model is used in the DRNG; i.e. processor resident entropy source is used to
repeatedly seed a hardware-implemented cryptographically secure PRNG. This
structure is shown in Figure 2.5 taken from [3]. Recall that Figure 2.5 is more
technical version of Figure 2.3. Furthermore, it represents a self-contained hard-
ware module that is isolated from software attacks on its internal state [3]. As
a result, Intel advocates that DRNG is a solution that achieves RNG objectives
with considerable robustness: statistical quality (independence, uniform distri-
bution), highly unpredictable random number sequences, high performance, and
protection against attack.
Figure 2.5: Digital random number generator’s cascaded component architecture
(taken from [3]). Intel’s new hardware RNG uses hardware-based components in
all of the three layers.
In order to check the performance, security and reliability of the RNG, Intel
asked Cryptography Research to review the design of the RNG [30]. DRNG
uses post-processing to obtain secure seeds from the entropy source. However,
in the analysis report [31], it is found that defects in the entropy source become
more difficult to observe due to using post-processing. Therefore, users of the
RNG may experience a more difficult time assessing the quality of the underlying
entropy source, and some catastrophic failure modes can actually become hard
33
to detect [31]. As a solution, the Intel Ivy Bridge designers incorporated a circuit
to monitor the health of the entropy source. In addition, while raw access to
entropy source output is not available on production parts, test parts can provide
direct access to entropy source outputs to make analysis easier. As a whole, the
Ivy Bridge RNG is a robust design with a large margin of safety that ensures
good random data is generated even if the entropy source is not operating as well
as predicted and in all cases, users should check the carry flag after each call to
the RNG to verify that it is working properly and the random data received is
valid [31].
There are many processors which support hardware RNG as indicated above.
However, many processors used actively nowadays do not have hardware RNG
installed on them. Hardware RNG is used when the security requirements are
hard to satisfy. Recall that, the cost of adding hardware RNG to the system
is also considerable; therefore, many producers do not add it to most of their
systems.
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Chapter 3
Potential Vulnerabilities During
Initialization
”God doesn’t play dice with
the universe.”
—Albert Einstein
Up to this point, all we do is merely looking at the source codes and analyzing
the related works. In order to understand and analyze the system better, observ-
ing the inputs and intermediate values can be very helpful. Therefore, we modify
the related kernel files to obtain some information about the running system,
especially random number generator part. There are different approaches to do
this. First one is to write intermediate states into the file in kernel space; however
as indicated in [32], writing to file in kernel space is not recommended. Instead,
writing a driver which takes desired values from kernel space and pushes them
into the user space, and writing a user-mode program which interprets those val-
ues and writes them into a file is a preferable method. However, this method is
also not feasible for us; because modification in Android source is necessary and
the source download is approximately 8.5 GB in size; additionally we will need
over 30 GB free space to complete a single build, and up to 100 GB (or more)
free space for a full set of builds [33].
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We use kernel print function printk to attain desired information. This ap-
proach requires extra system calls in kernel which cause delay on the running
system; yet these negative results do not effect random number generator’s algo-
rithms, internal states and running. Therefore, we prefer this approach so selected
results can be printed to kernel logs. Then we obtain these values by reading the
kernel logs of the emulated Android system on the computer.
Another possible method can be sending necessary packets over network
as preferred in [21]. Vuillemin et al. advocate their method by saying that
using network interface may have less influence over the system, because it
does not cause disk event while trying to write extra information to the ker-
nel log file. Vuillemin et. al. had to chose whether include/linux/net.h or
include/linux/netpoll.h kernel API to send UDP packets. The first one is
pretty similar to the standard user space socket API. The second one is more
low-level and rarely used. They chose the second one, because it works even in
IRQ contexts, which is required to instrument input events.
3.1 System Setup
Most of the work is done on our personal computer. It has Windows 7 as main
operating system, 8 GB RAM and eight-core processor. For compiling kernel, we
create virtual machine which has 3 GB RAM and quad-core processor by using
Oracle VirtualBox, and install Linux-Ubuntu 12.04 on it. To emulate Android,
we download Android SDK to windows, create new Android device by using AVD
(Android Virtual Device) Manager and run the emulator with Android 4.1.2.
Creating the virtual machine by using VirtualBox is a simple task. After this
step, we download Ubuntu 12.04 and install Ubuntu to virtual machine. Then
by following instructions in [33] and its sub-pages, we download Android source
code and Android kernel source code. These code lines are included in Code B.1
and Code B.2.
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We download the sources and then modify related parts of the kernel. As it
was mentioned before, we use printk to print necessary information to kernel
logs. Normally, timestamps of printk outputs are not shown in the kernel log.
In order to include these outputs, we need to change kernel/printk.c file by
removing if (printk time) condition as described in Code B.3. After this mod-
ification, all printk outputs will contain timestamps in kernel logs. Beside this
little modification, it is necessary to increase kernel buffer size. Default kernel
buffer size is 64 KB and this buffer is overwritten if log size exceed this size.
Normally, all logs can be fetched using Android SDK interface functions to the
file on the computer continuously; however, initial access to kernel logs takes
some time. This may cause a problem, because initial logs disappear when the
first access occurs. This problem is solved by changing CONFIG LOG BUF SHIFT
parameter from 16 to 17 in /arch/arm/configs/goldfish armv7 defconfig file
as described in Code B.4. After this modification, kernel buffer size becomes 128
KB and it is enough space to hold kernel logs until initial access occurs.
After these pre-modifications, we modify random.c file in /drivers/char
directory to observe internal states of the random number generator. Then it is
time to compile modified Android kernel for emulator. Again, this task is simple
by following the instructions in the related page of [33] and these steps are also
included in Code B.5.
Sequential to successful compilation, we copy zImage file from the directory
of /arch/arm/boot/zImage to Windows environment where Android emulator
is installed. Then we run the emulator with modified kernel by following the
instructions in Code B.6 and get continuous kernel logs from that device by using
the instructions in Code B.7 while the emulator is running.
Before starting the analysis, we check whether hardware RNG is installed on
the emulator system by following the instructions in Code B.8 while the emulator
is running. As it is expected, there is no hardware RNG installed on the system.
Beside the emulator test, we check Samsung Galaxy Nexus and Asus Nexus 7 for
hardware RNG but they have no hardware RNG, either. In the future, when the
security requirements become more sophisticated and cost of adding hardware
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prng.seed(seed)
p = prng.generate_random_prime ()
prng.add_randomness(bits)
q = prng.generate_random_prime ()
N = p*q
Algorithm 3.1: OpenSSL RSA key generation algorithm. If there is not enough
entropy before seeding, seed will be the same for different startup sessions, thus
same p will be generated.
RNG diminishes; it will be possible to see many Android devices with hardware
RNG.
After defining complete working system, collected data is ready for analysis.
3.2 Analysis of Initialization
The weakest states of the Linux RNG is in initialization phase of the system.
There is not much input to make pools random so there is not enough entropy
to produce cryptographically secure random numbers. Additionally, there are
not many alternative initialization sequences of the system; therefore, internal
states of random number generators may be similar between different initializa-
tion procedures. As it was mentioned earlier, wireless routers have not enough
entropy inputs; they produce same output stream even after system is completely
started [18]. Different devices of the same manufacturer may also give similar out-
put streams. In [12, 13], it is shown that there are many common RSA private
keys on the Internet. Main source of the problems mentioned here is producing
the key during initialization process of the devices. There is not enough entropy,
there is not any input which makes internal states of the pool different than an-
other initialization sequences. This problem, RSA key generation trouble, can be
summarized as follows. In order to see the problem clearly, it will be helpful to
see OpenSSL RSA key generation algorithm in Algorithm 3.1:
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Now suppose poor entropy at startup. Then same p will be generated by
multiple devices, but different q because entropy increased differently. If N1 and
N2 which are RSA keys from different devices are examined, it can be seen that
gcd(N1,N2) = p. This reveals private key of these systems. In [12, 13], many
public keys are collected from the Internet and these public keys are searched for
common prime factors. As a result, 0.4% of public HTTPS keys are factored;
therefore, it is important to make sure that random number generator is properly
seeded during key generation. In [34], it is indicated that OpenSSL RNG is
competent, problem is in its seeding. In order to eliminate this problem, it is
suggested that random number generators must be seeded by external sources
properly and the characteristics of the seed source has very critical effects on
random number generation.
In our experiments, initialization process is considered as the interval between
power on time and the end time of disk checking process; i.e. after this point
device is ready to use. The reason why we do not include the time after disk
check is completed is that user-mode inputs make random number generator less
guessable, thereby cryptographically secure. When user starts to use Android
device, his/her operations are considered as user-input like keyboard and mouse
movements; i.e. event codes of the operations (touching, tapping etc.) are defined
in /usr/include/linux/input.h.
During the initialization process, there is not any input from the user; only en-
tropy source to input pool comes from disk randomness. Disk-randomness inputs
mostly come during disk-check process. Only two inputs come when the pools
are initialized, which makes internal state of the pools different. These inputs are
system time in nanosecond scale and system constant (utsname, which contains
information about the system and device). System constant does not provide
security, because it is always the same and known to attacker; i.e. any other
device with same model has the same system constant. As it is recommended
in [18], making system constant different for each device may improve the secu-
rity of randomness. As a result, only input which affect the randomness of the
input pool is system time at pool initialization. Because it has nanosecond scale,
pool initialization time will not be the same for different initializations with very
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/net/core/neighbour.c
/net/netfilter/nfnetlink log.c
/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
/net/bridge/br fdb.c
/kernel/panic.c
/lib/random32.c
/fs/binfmt elf.c
/net/ipv4/route.c
/net/ipv4/af inet.c
/net/core/request sock.c
/net/netlink/af netlink.c
/net/netfilter/nf conntrack core.c
Table 3.1: Random number requesting files during initialization. These files re-
quest random numbers to use in their service during initialization. These services
are not as critical as key generation, so it is acceptable for these services to request
random numbers with lower entropy.
high probability. In short, pools have enough randomness for simple tasks after
initialization but it is still vulnerable to strong cryptographic attacks.
When we sift through the kernel logs, we see that classes request random
numbers from /dev/urandom in Table 3.1. When we look these files and random
number related parts, we do not see crucial points for security. So system may
not be under risk even if the random numbers are not cryptographically strong.
After initialization, input pool has zero bits of entropy and it stays the same
until first disk randomness comes as input. Initialization times of input pool
change between 470 – 520 ms; first disk randomness times change between 620
ms – 670 ms. After first disk randomness, there will not be any other disk
randomness until disk check part begins at the last part of initialization; i.e.
about 50 – 60 seconds after power-on. During this time period, input pool stays
the same. After this steady time period, disk check period comes and during that
period entropy of input pool increase and when it becomes greater than 192 bits,
then some bits will be transferred to nonblocking pool from the input pool.
In our simulations, initialization time can be in 50 ms interval which is 50×106
ns. Similarly, first disk randomness time can be in 50 ms interval. However, the
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time between initialization time and first disk randomness can be from 125 ms to
150 ms. This is 25 ms interval which is 25 × 106 ns. As a result, there are total
1.25×1015 possibilities which is approximately equivalent to 52 bits. Therefore, it
can be assumed that, after first disk randomness there are 252 possible input pool
states which is large enough to prevent simulating all possible states for Android
devices. Namely, it can be said that it is hard to implement simulating possible
states attack in [18].
Regarding the nonblocking pool, the initialization process is more compli-
cated. Normally, initialization procedure is simple and it should be represented
as explained in the following lines.
The outputs of nonblocking pool are totally deterministic if its internal state
just after the initialization is known. Because there is only extracting process
which does not add any randomness to pool, it just mixes the pool with its output
to provide forward security. Only chance to add randomness to nonblocking pool
is to transfer some bits from the input pool. However, input pool does not
provide any bits until its entropy exceeds 192 bits. As it was indicated in the
previous chapter, this entropy is reserved for blocking pool to prevent requester
process be blocked. In our simulations, input pool entropy passes 192 bit level at
the near-end of the initialization part. Hence most of the random numbers are
still deterministic assuming that internal state of nonblocking pool just after the
initialization is known.
However, the initialization procedure of nonblocking pool in Android devices
is not so simple. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Android developers pro-
vide more randomness during initialization by writing to /dev/urandom file. The
/frameworks/base/services/java/com/android/server/EntropyService.java
file in Android source is a service designed to load and periodically (in every three
hours) save randomness for the Linux kernel. This service carries the entropy pool
information across shutdowns and startups; therefore, entropy pools is not in a
fairly predictable state anymore; i.e. they will not return predictable data. As
a future plan, this service will be changed in a way such that it will write en-
tropy data at shutdown time instead of periodically. The relevant code snippet
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public EntropyService ()
{
this(getSystemDir () + "/entropy.dat" , "/dev/urandom");
}
Code 3.1: The code for getting entropy file and random device names - part of
EntropyService.java.
which shows entropy file and random device is in Code 3.1. Recall that Android
uses only /dev/urandom again; i.e. /dev/random is not used. However, as it
will be explained, writing to /dev/urandom results in mixing the same data into
/dev/random.
In order to make this service work as expected, the data written to the pool
must be unpredictable. During the initialization, entropy.dat file, which con-
tains random data from previous session is mixed into /dev/urandom at the
beginning. After this, device-specific data is mixed into /dev/urandom, because
making the data unique to the device complicates the attack to randomness.
As indicated in EntropyService.java, even sending non-random information
to /dev/urandom is useful because, while it does not increase the quality of the
entropy pool, it mixes more bits into the pool, which results in a higher degree
of uncertainty in the generated randomness. Like nature, writes to the random
device can only cause the quality of the entropy in the kernel to stay the same
or increase. For maximum effect, information writing to /dev/urandom varies
on a per-device basis, and is not easily observable to an attacker. As shown in
Code 3.2, beside some constant data, device specific data such as serial num-
ber and variable data for instance time, carrier, baseband etc. is written to
/dev/random to increase randomness. Note that in Android 4.2 JellyBean , the
name of EntropyService.java is changed to EntropyMixer.java.
When any data is written on either /dev/random or /dev/urandom device,
random write function is called to perform the operation. In the implemen-
tation of this function, the same data is written to both devices by calling
write pool function for both devices. Therefore writing to either /dev/random or
/dev/urandom device causes writing the same data to both devices. However, this
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out.println("Copyright (C) 2009 The Android Open Source
Project");
out.println("All Your Randomness Are Belong To Us");
out.println(START_TIME);
out.println(START_NANOTIME);
out.println(SystemProperties.get("ro.serialno"));
out.println(SystemProperties.get("ro.bootmode"));
out.println(SystemProperties.get("ro.baseband"));
out.println(SystemProperties.get("ro.carrier"));
out.println(SystemProperties.get("ro.bootloader"));
out.println(SystemProperties.get("ro.hardware"));
out.println(SystemProperties.get("ro.revision"));
out.println(new Object ().hashCode ());
out.println(System.currentTimeMillis ());
out.println(System.nanoTime ());
Code 3.2: The code for writing device specific information to random device -
part of EntropyService.java. By doing this, initialization will not be the same
for different devices.
loadInitialEntropy ();
addDeviceSpecificEntropy ();
writeEntropy ();
scheduleEntropyWriter ();
Code 3.3: Initialization service of Android - part of EntropyService.java.
Firstly load the random file from the previous session, then write device spe-
cific information to random device, subsequently write new random file for next
session and finally schedule the last job to do periodically.
writing operations does not increase entropy of the pools, it just mixes the data
to be written into the pool. After this procedure, first periodic /entropy.dat
file generation for next startup session is accomplished. The next period comes
after 3 hours as indicated in EntropyService.java. The summary of these steps
in EntropyService.java is shown is Code 3.3. As it can be seen, first the ran-
domness from file is written to nonblocking pool, then device specific entropy is
mixed into nonblocking pool. After satisfying randomness requirements, gener-
ating randomness file is executed by this service.
While scanning the resulting kernel logs, we are able to see all of the op-
erations expressed above. loadInitialEntropy() function writes the data in
43
/entropy.dat to /dev/urandom. In this operation, random write function is
called once and random write function calls write pool function 64 times for
blocking pool and 64 times for nonblocking pool. In each call of write pool
function, 64 bytes of data is mixed to the pool. In short, 64 × 64 = 4096 bytes
of data is mixed into both of the secondary pools.
Then we are able to observe operation of addDeviceSpecificEntropy() func-
tion. During the addition of data in Code 3.2, random write function is called
once and random write function calls write pool function three times for block-
ing pool and three times for nonblocking pool. Total 64 + 64 + 60 = 188 bytes
of data is mixed to both pools. One sample of device-specific data taken by Hex
Workshop v6.6 is shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Sample output of device specific data. It is possible to link the items
in Code 3.2 with this Hex Workshop v6.6 screen.
After the addition of device specific information, current entropy is written to
/entropy.dat file to use on next startup. During this operation, urandom read
function is called and 4096 bytes of data is extracted from nonblocking pool.
All of the extracted data is written into /entropy.dat file. This file should be
constant until three hours from last writing process. However, we did not test if
/entropy.dat is updated periodically. Instead of observing the periodic update,
we observed that the data written to /entropy.dat on a session is the same as
the data read from /entropy.dat on next session.
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As a result, it is not possible to implement simple attack on nonblocking pool
in Android devices. It is very hard to simulate its states, hence the attack in [18]
cannot be applied to Android devices.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation of Linux Entropy
Estimator
”The total entropy of any
isolated thermodynamic
system tends to increase over
time, approaching a
maximum value.”
—The second law of
thermodynamics
Entropy estimator is crucial part of the Linux random number generator. All
randomness assumptions are made based on this estimator. Therefore it is very
important to analyze its algorithm and check its correctness; i.e. whether it over-
estimates or underestimates the entropy. Normally, it is expected of an estimator
to underestimate the entropy, so random number generator should guarantee that
it can provide at least estimated amount of random bits; i.e. getting 128-bit key
which has 100 bit randomness case should not be possible.
As it was described in the previous chapter, Linux uses time difference to
estimate the randomness of the inputs. There is not detailed information about
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- Consider the three interpolating polynomials based upon
the last three events.
- Compute the three interpolation errors according to the
new event.
- Take the minimum of these errors.
- Compute the logarithm in base 2 of this minimum (bounded
by 0 and 11).
Algorithm 4.1: Entropy estimation algorithm using interpolation. Entropy esti-
mator in Linux is mathematically equivalent to the steps above.
why this particular estimator and parameters are used in the Linux source com-
mentaries. It is a simple and cheap entropy estimator [21]. It was chosen for its
cost, not for its accuracy [19]. As indicated in [19], entropy estimation is based
on a few reasonable assumptions. First, it is assumed that most of the entropy
of the input samples is contained in their timings. Timing contains both the
cycle and jiffies counts; however, the jiffies count has a much coarser granularity.
The Linux RNG uses the pessimistic estimator by basing its entropy estimation
on the jiffies count only. Adding additional values, even if they are completely
known, can only increase the entropy; i.e. it cannot decrease the uncertainty
of the already collected data. The other assumption is that the input samples
coming from different sources are independent. Hence, entropy can be estimated
separately for each source which are user input, interrupts, and disk I/O and
summed up in the end. The estimator keeps track of the jiffies count of each
source separately. The entropy is estimated from the jiffies’ difference between
two events. Still, it is pretty good at detecting regularities [21]. A study [20] pro-
poses an interpretation based on Newton polynomial interpolation. This study
summarizes the estimation process as algorithm in Algorithm 4.1.
Additionally, another crucial point has to be mentioned. While running the
emulator and scanning the kernel logs, we see that most of the events add zero
entropy to the input pool. The reason why this occurs lies behind the imple-
mentation of the estimator. Because of this property, Linux random number
generator can be characterized as conservative [17]. This may be quite a severe
bottleneck for the blocking interface to the LRNG.
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It is argued that /dev/random may fail to provide information-theoretic secu-
rity even if the entropy estimator is correct [6]. For example, in Linux kernel v2.4,
both streams (/dev/random and /dev/urandom) use the same entropy pool (there
is only one secondary pool in Linux kernel v2.4), so the output of /dev/urandom
leaks information also about the state of /dev/random. And even when this two
streams use syntactically distinct pools (as in the Linux kernel v2.6), it is advo-
cated that there is no guarantee of information theoretic security for /dev/random
as long as they are refreshed from possibly dependent data [6].
After explaining the main logic behind the Linux entropy estimator; now it
is time to see how pessimistic it calculates the entropy by comparing with two
different entropy estimation methods: Maximum likelihood entropy estimator
and compression.
4.1 Comparison of Linux Entropy Estimator
with Maximum Likelihood Entropy Estima-
tor
As it was indicated before, entropy estimator estimates the entropy by using only
time differences between subsequent events. During this comparison, the entropy
will also be calculated using only time differences. In [35], Shannon defined
entropy as the quantity which will measure, in some sense, how much information
is produced by the source, or better, at what rate information is produced by
the source when all possible outcomes are given with their probabilities. In other
words, entropy gives an idea about the randomness and uncertainty of the source.
In Linux RNG, entropy events increase the entropy of the input pool with
respect to related time difference value. Namely, time difference values determine
the entropy—randomness and uncertainty—of the input pool. From the similar
perspective, time difference values of these events can be thought as the source
and each individual event can be taken as an outcome of the source. The source
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feeds randomness to input pool by giving its outcomes. If all outcomes and their
probabilities are known exactly, then the entropy of the source—time difference
values—could be calculated by using Shannon’s entropy function. Shannon’s
entropy function is defined in [35] as follows:
Suppose we have a set of possible outcomes whose probabilities of occurrences
are p = (p1, p2,. . . , pm). Then the entropy of the source is defined as
H(p) = −
m∑
i=1
pi log2(pi) (4.1)
In our case, we do not have exact and known values for outcomes and their
occurrence probabilities. Therefore, a new question arises: Given the sample
output of the source, how can we estimate the entropy of the source? The answer
is stated in [36] as follows:
All output samples are assumed to be independent and identically distributed.
When each symbol is included for n = (n1, n2,. . . ,nm) in the observed sample set,
entropy is generally estimated by substituting p in Equation (4.1) with maximum
likelihood estimates of occurring probabilities of source symbols, pˆ = n/N, as
HˆMLE(n) = H(n/N) = H(pˆ) (4.2)
In [36], estimator HˆMLE(n) is referred as the maximum likelihood entropy
estimator.
Considering the information above, we need to customize the Equation (4.2)
to our needs. In order to calculate the maximum likelihood entropy of time
differences using Shannon’s entropy function, we should take time differences as
samples and find their frequencies.
Let N be the size of the sample outcome δ1,δ2,. . . ,δN. Let pˆη = # {i : δi = η} /N
be the empirical frequency of η in the given sequence. Suppose there are D dif-
ferent outcome with frequency space pˆ = (pˆ1, pˆ2,. . . , pˆD). We then compute
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Maximum-Likelihood
Entropy of first level δ
Maximum-Likelihood
Entropy of min. δ
Entropy calculated
by Linux Estimator
1.5988 1.5620 0.2384
1.6775 1.6356 0.2588
1.7104 1.6596 0.3223
2.0644 2.0647 0.5053
2.3312 2.2745 0.6187
Table 4.1: Comparison of maximum likelihood entropy estimator and Linux es-
timator. First column shows the ML entropy estimation of first level δ, second
column shows the ML entropy estimation of minimum δ and last column shows
entropy estimation of Linux estimator. Recall that all estimations are based on
δ values—time-differences.
Equation (4.3) to find maximum likelihood entropy estimation over the empirical
data:
Hˆ = −
D∑
η=0
pˆ(η) log2(pˆ(η)) (4.3)
The result of Equation (4.3) is the maximum-likelihood entropy calculated by
time differences; in other words, this is the entropy-per-sample. In estimation
algorithm, there are three levels of δ and Linux estimator uses minimum of them.
Therefore, we take the minimum of these δ levels for each sample like the estimator
does. However, in [19] only first level δ is used for maximum-likelihood entropy
calculation. Therefore, we include both calculations; i.e. we use both minimum δ
and first level δ. In order to add more meaning to out comparison, we should also
include per-event entropy calculated by Linux estimator. For this, we sum up the
entropy added to the system for each event and divide it to the number of events.
As a result, we obtain entropy-per-event calculated by Linux estimator. Now we
have entropy-per-sample calculated using Equation (4.3) and entropy-per-event
calculated using the Linux estimator. The comparison of these are shown in
Table 4.1.
Recall that, there is not significant difference between maximum-likelihood
entropy calculated using minimum δ and first level δ. However, as expected,
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Linux estimator is very pessimistic on this calculation. As it was mentioned be-
fore, being pessimistic on entropy estimation is acceptable and must condition
for security so Linux passes this test successfully. Also note that, last two rows
of Table 4.1 have greater entropy values than the others; because, last two sim-
ulations of the system contain user-mode operation while first three simulations
of the system last until the end of the disk-check process; i.e. no user-input in-
cluded. This is consistent with the statement that the most vulnerable states of
Android devices are during the initialization; after user starts to use the device,
randomness and entropy increase dramatically.
4.2 Comparison of Linux Entropy Estimator
with Compression Results
In the previous section, we compare the estimator’s performance by calculat-
ing maximum-likelihood entropy of time differences by using Shannon’s entropy
function. In this section, we try to calculate the entropy of the input pool by
measuring the randomness of the inputs which mix the input pool. These inputs
are added to the input pool by mixing it with the algorithm described before.
Therefore, randomness of these inputs determines the entropy of the input pool.
Linux estimator use only time differences, jiffies part of these inputs as it was
told before.
Entropy effectively bounds the performance of the strongest lossless (or nearly
lossless) compression possible; because compression algorithms use the correlation
of subsequences in its input. Random sequence has little or no correlation between
its subsequences; hence, random sequences are compressed a little or they cannot
be compressed. The performance of existing data compression algorithms is often
used as a rough estimate of the entropy of a data block [37].
By using this information, we concatenate all the inputs to the input pool
and compress the concatenated result by using the best compression algorithm
of WinRAR v4.0.1. The compressed size can be roughly thought as the entropy
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of all inputs. Input pool has zero entropy at the beginning, initialization does
not increase entropy. Therefore, we include only disk-randomness inputs during
initialization part to calculate and compare entropy. Results for 72 different runs
of the system are shown in Table 4.2.
No Size(byte)
Comp. Size
(byte)
LRNG Est.
(bit)
Ratio of
Est./Comp.
1 10082 577 144 0.03
2 9026 567 139 0.03
3 8642 593 202 0.04
4 8834 573 162 0.03
5 8546 566 254 0.05
6 8834 584 166 0.03
7 8450 550 144 0.03
8 7970 560 157 0.03
9 7682 536 133 0.03
10 9266 579 156 0.03
11 9218 567 172 0.03
12 8450 573 186 0.04
13 9410 601 218 0.04
14 8882 566 134 0.02
15 7874 562 168 0.03
16 8834 576 167 0.03
17 10658 624 235 0.04
18 8258 572 170 0.03
19 8498 582 191 0.04
20 8498 577 196 0.04
21 9986 604 247 0.05
22 10274 623 251 0.05
23 9410 599 212 0.04
24 8438 604 234 0.04
25 7846 655 231 0.04
Continued on next page
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Table 4.2 – Continued from previous page
No Size(byte)
Comp. Size
(byte)
LRNG Est.
(bit)
Ratio of
Est./Comp.
26 10102 679 246 0.04
27 13194 705 284 0.05
28 8930 595 187 0.03
29 10966 700 241 0.04
30 10658 636 231 0.04
31 9986 600 211 0.04
32 9398 599 191 0.03
33 11894 647 244 0.04
34 8546 584 211 0.04
35 13194 716 292 0.05
36 11370 710 252 0.04
37 8402 577 190 0.04
38 10706 628 204 0.04
39 8930 604 204 0.04
40 11542 691 257 0.04
41 8450 577 205 0.04
42 10274 613 231 0.04
43 8450 583 212 0.04
44 8258 582 205 0.04
45 8258 583 175 0.03
46 7682 544 154 0.03
47 9026 589 186 0.03
48 8978 588 199 0.04
49 9354 705 242 0.04
50 9374 584 165 0.03
51 10178 621 229 0.04
52 13154 637 238 0.04
53 12434 632 231 0.04
54 11234 626 201 0.04
Continued on next page
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Table 4.2 – Continued from previous page
No Size(byte)
Comp. Size
(byte)
LRNG Est.
(bit)
Ratio of
Est./Comp.
55 10390 671 208 0.03
56 11138 643 243 0.04
57 9842 601 205 0.04
58 12714 729 270 0.04
59 9890 613 244 0.04
60 13406 655 270 0.05
61 6734 524 143 0.03
62 9334 669 218 0.04
63 8738 586 186 0.03
64 13154 628 234 0.04
65 13154 634 236 0.04
66 8630 564 138 0.03
67 8642 576 145 0.03
68 8546 582 204 0.04
69 9122 587 200 0.04
70 7682 564 205 0.04
71 10082 613 241 0.04
72 3566 348 72 0.02
Table 4.2: Comparison of WinRAR’s best compression and Linux entropy esti-
mator. First column shows the total size of the concatenated size of all entropy
events which mix into the input pool. Second column shows compressed (with
WinRAR’s best compression) size. Third column is the entropy estimation of
Linux. Last column is the ratio between Linux entropy estimation and com-
pressed sizes which can be thought as entropy of all events. On average, entropy
estimated by compression is 23 times greater than entropy estimated by Linux.
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As it can be seen from Table 4.2; although concatenated inputs are compressed
to 0.04-0.07 of their original sizes, it is still far, far greater than estimator’s esti-
mation. On average, entropy estimated by compression is 23 times greater than
entropy estimated by Linux. In short, estimator again estimates pessimistically
as it is expected in this test.
In addition to the concatenated inputs test, we test if input pools’ parallel
states are correlated or not. All pools are initialized to zero at the beginning. At
first, time is mixed into the input pool, we can call this the first state. For all
different initializations, in order to indicate first states of all input pools, we use
first parallel state. All the first states of the input pools in different initialization
are concatenated and compressed, which we call the compression of concatenation
of first parallel states. The size of input pool is 512 bytes and the size of time
input is 8 bytes. Therefore, input pool still contains lots of zeros, unchanged
region after the first mixing. After mixing with time, input pool is mixed with
the system information, utsname structure, which is the size of 390 bytes. After
this second mixing process, all parts of the input pool is mixed. We call this the
second state. As a third step, disk randomness is mixed, which gives us the third
state. On these terms, parallel states can be defined as follows: after the first mix
of the pool in all runs, after the second mix of the pool in all runs etc. Second and
third states and their compressions are defined in a similar way to the first state.
After collecting data, we concatenate first three parallel states of the input pools
and try to compress these three concatenated files. For the compression process,
we again use the best compression algorithm of WinRAR v4.0.1. First parallel
state is compressed with the ratio of 0.07. This can be expected, because input
pool is nearly all zero and unchanged. Second and third parallel states are not
compressed; i.e. their compression ratio is one. As it can be seen in Figure 4.3,
first parallel state is compressed while the second and third parallel states are
not compressed. This can be translated as after second mixing, there will be no
apparent correlation between parallel runs of the input pool. As a result, it can
be said that it is difficult to find correlation and similarities between independent
runs.
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Parallel States Total Size (byte) Compressed Size
Parallel State 0 36864 2591
Parallel State 1 36864 36864
Parallel State 2 36864 36864
Table 4.3: Comparison of normal and compressed (with WinRAR’s best com-
pression) sizes of the first three concatenated parallel pool states. As it can be
seen, after second state, input pools are no longer similar because there is no
compression.
4.3 Evaluation of the Results
In this chapter, we compared Linux entropy estimator with two different entropy
estimation methods. First method was based on Shannon’s entropy function. In
order to apply Shannon function, output values of the source and their occur-
rence probabilities must be known. This was not possible for our tests; therefore
we needed to make an estimation for necessary parameters by using sample out-
come obtained through our test mechanism. We applied maximum likelihood
estimation on the sample, and then applied Shannon’s entropy function on the
estimation. Calculating the entropy estimation, these results were compared
against Linux entropy estimation. Our findings showed that Linux estimator is
pessimistic as it should be; i.e. the ratio between our results and estimation of
Linux changed between 3–8. As it was mentioned before, being pessimistic on
estimating the entropy is a preferred property for random number generators be-
cause they should never overestimate the entropy. Providing less than asserted
amount of entropy may lead to weaknesses on secure systems.
The second method was based on compression. There is a negative correla-
tion between compressibility and randomness; i.e. the more random the data is,
the less compressible it becomes. During this test, we initially compressed the
events data—inputs for the input pool— and observed its randomness, in other
words, estimated its entropy. The results were much higher than Linux entropy
estimation. Later on, we compressed the concatenated input pool states to detect
the correlation between different initializations. At the end, we found that there
was no correlation between input pool states which means that Linux provides
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unique randomness for each run of the system; i.e. during the simulations it is
very difficult to reach the same internal states.
As a result, we conclude that Linux random number generator estimates the
entropy in a pessimistic way and it provides distinct states on different runs.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
”The generation of random
numbers is too important to
be left to chance.”
—Robert R. Coveyou
In this thesis, we analyzed Android random number generator statically and
dynamically in order to diagnose its weaknesses. Initially, historical examples of
attacks on different random number generators were given in order to emphasize
the importance of the topic. Then the works on operating systems’ random
number generator were examined generally.
After the preparation phase, static analysis of Android random number gener-
ator was done. Source code of operating system and the kernel were examined at
first. While investigating the general structure of Android SecureRandom class,
it was found that the seed for that generator actually comes from Linux random
number generator. Thus, it was deduced that the security of Android RNG relies
on the security of Linux RNG. After this discovery, Linux RNG was analyzed
statically. Its general structure and main components were explained in detail.
As a conclusion to this chapter, the differences between the version Android em-
ulator used (v2.6.29) and the latest Linux kernel version on April 30th, 2013
(v3.9.0) were listed and explained.
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Statical section of the thesis concluded with code analysis and dynamical
section began with the modifications on kernel code. Linux RNG file random.c
in Android kernel was modified in a way so that its internal states and operation
can be observed concretely from the kernel logs. The most vulnerable stage of
Linux random number generator was the initialization process. With this in mind,
the initialization phase of Android was investigated and it was found that there
is not any evident flaw or weakness in the design. Even its security is improved
with respect to normal Linux by writing device-specific information to entropy
pools.
Having surveyed the Android random number generator during the initializa-
tion of the device, its entropy estimator and the performance of entropy estimator
were studied. Estimation of operating system was compared with maximum like-
lihood entropy estimation over time differences and it was found that estimation
of operating system is pessimistic with respect to our findings. After this test,
considering the relationship between entropy and compression, entropy providing
inputs were concatenated and compressed. Then compressed size was compared
with the entropy estimation. The results revealed that the estimator of operating
system is again pessimistic. Estimating the entropy lower guarantees that ran-
domness is at least at the level of estimation. This prevents the crucial problems
related with low entropy.
Beside the analysis of Android random number generator running on the
emulator, analysis of Android running on hardware can be performed; because,
when the main computer is busy, emulator works in a slower way; i.e. it finishes
initialization at a longer time. In order to avoid this effect, we always run the
emulator under similar workload on the main computer. Running Android OS
on Android device will totally eliminate this effect, because no external impact
interrupts the running system.
To conclude, Android random number generator is well designed, improved
through the contributions from many developers and updated in accordance with
the findings of works that are related to random number generator. For today,
security related problems may occur only if it is used in a wrong way. But for
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the future, it is important to strengthen the Android RNG with the support of
hardware RNG. As the time goes on, when the security requirements become more
sophisticated and cost of adding hardware RNG diminishes; it will be possible to
see many Android devices with hardware RNG.
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Appendix A
Hardware and Software
Information
A.1 System Information
Main system and virtual systems used in this work are listed below:
Main Computer : Packard Bell Easy Note TS11HR
Processor : Intel R© CoreTM i7-2630QM CPU
@ 2.00 GHz 4 Cores 8 Logical Processors
Installed Memory (RAM) : 8 GB
OS : Windows 7 Home Premium Service Pack 1
System Type : 64-bit Operating System
HDD : 750 GB
Virtual Computer : on VirtualBox
Processor : Intel R© CoreTM i7-2630QM CPU
@ 2.00 GHz 2 Cores 4 Logical Processors
Installed Memory (RAM) : 3 GB
OS : Ubuntu 12.04
66
System Type : 64-bit Operating System
HDD : 100 GB
Emulated Android : on Android Virtual Device Manager
Processor : ARM (armeabi-v7a)
OS : Android 4.1.2 - API Level 16
SD Card : 8 GB
A.2 Software Information
Software used on main system are listed in Table A.1.
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Appendix B
Codes
All codes referring from Section 3.1 are presented below:
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mkdir ~/bin
PATH =~/bin:$PATH
sudo apt -get install curl
curl https ://dl -ssl.google.com/dl/googlesource/git -repo/repo > ~/bin/repo
chmod a+x ~/bin/repo
mkdir WORKING_DIRECTORY
cd WORKING_DIRECTORY
sudo apt -get install git -core
repo init -u https :// android.googlesource.com/platform/manifest
repo sync -j1
# If download becomes problematic , then try to disable ipv6
gksudo gedit /etc/default/grub
# change GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT =" quiet splash" line to
# GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT =" ipv6.disable =1 quiet splash"
sudo update -grub
Code B.1: Android source code download
git init
git clone https :// android.googlesource.com/kernel/goldfish
cd goldfish/
git branch -a
git checkout -t origin/android -goldfish -2.6.29 -b goldfish
Code B.2: Android kernel source code download
# assuming that kernel source is downloaded to "goldfish" folder under home
gedit ~/ goldfish/kernel/printk.c
# change line 747 from "if ( printk_time ) {" to "// if ( printk_time ) {"
# change line 763 from "}" to "// }"
Code B.3: Enable printing of timestamp
# assuming that kernel source is downloaded to "goldfish" folder under home
gedit ~/ goldfish/arch/arm/configs/goldfish_armv7_defconfig
# change line 50 from " CONFIG_LOG_BUF_SHIFT =16" to " CONFIG_LOG_BUF_SHIFT =17"
Code B.4: Increase kernel printk buffer size
# assuming that kernel source is downloaded to "goldfish" folder under home
export PATH =~/ prebuilt/linux -x86/toolchain/arm -eabi -4.4.3/ bin:$PATH
export ARCH=arm
export SUBARCH=arm
export CROSS_COMPILE=arm -eabi -
make goldfish_armv7_defconfig
# X is the number of processors to run during compilation ; parallel jobs
make -jX
Code B.5: Compile Android kernel
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:: open command windows as administrator
:: assuming that installation is completed with default settings
cd C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Local\Android\android -sdk\tools
:: assuming that kernel image name is not changed
emulator.exe @Deneme -kernel zImage
Code B.6: Run Android emulator with desired kernel
:: open command windows as administrator
:: assuming that installation is completed with default settings
cd C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Local\Android\android -sdk\platform -tools
:: output kernel logs to log.txt continuosly
adb shell cat /proc/kmsg > log.txt
Code B.7: Get kernel logs continuously
:: open command windows as administrator
:: assuming that installation is completed with default settings
cd C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Local\Android\android -sdk\platform -tools
:: open shell to enter bash commands to Android device
adb shell
:: go to devices directory
cd /dev
:: list the files in devices directory
ls
:: there is no "hw_random", go to the attributes directory
cd /sys/class/misc
:: list the files in current directory
ls
:: no related files , no hardware RNG installed
Code B.8: Search for hardware RNG in Android
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